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We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount
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game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage-
game actions of player one perfectly. Player one’s type is private information and
he may be a “commitment type,” drawn from a countable set of commitment
types, who is locked into playing a particular strategy. Under a full-support as-
sumption on the monitoring structure, we prove a reputation result for repeated
moral hazard games: if there is positive probability that player one is a particular
type whose commitment payoff is equal to player one’s highest payoff, consistent
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type’s commitment payoff in any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the repeated game.
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1. Introduction
The desire to maintain one’s reputation is a powerful incentive in a long-run relationship as
a strong reputation can lend credibility to an individual’s (or an institution’s) commitments,
threats, or promises. It can help a firm commit to fight competitors planning to enter its
market, it can assist a government in committing to its monetary and fiscal policies, or it
can facilitate trade based on trust when formal institutions are lacking. In fact, a patient
player’s reputation concerns are the dominant incentives that determine equilibrium payoffs
in repeated games where a patient player faces a myopic opponent. And this is true regardless
of the monitoring structure.1
Building a reputation when facing an equally patient opponent, however, is more diffi-
cult. A patient opponent might be willing to sacrifice short-term payoffs to test whether
the player, who is trying to build a reputation, will go through with his threats or promises.
This makes it prohibitively expensive to build a reputation in certain repeated simultaneous-
move games played against a patient opponent if stage-game actions are perfectly monitored
(Cripps and Thomas (1997)). In this paper, we instead focus on repeated simultaneous-
move games played by equally patient players where the opponent’s stage-game actions are
imperfectly monitored. A leading example of significant economic interest is the repeated
principal-agent game. We show that reputation effects are prominent under imperfect mon-
itoring even in certain repeated games where reputation effects are absent under perfect
monitoring.
Specifically, suppose that player one’s type is private information and that he may be a
“commitment type” who is locked into playing a particular strategy. We explore whether
an uncommitted or “normal” player can exploit his opponent’s uncertainty to establish a
reputation for a particular behavior. We also address two related questions. First, we ask
which behavior (strategy or strategic posture) would a “normal” player mimic in order to
successfully build a beneficial reputation? In other words, which types, if available, facilitate
reputation building for player one?2 Second, we ask in which strategic situations (i.e., for
which class of stage games) can player one successfully build a reputation?
Our central finding is a reputation result in repeated games where player one (he) observes
only an imperfect public signal of his opponent’s stage-game action while his opponent (she)
perfectly monitors player one’s actions. We show that a patient player one can guarantee his
highest payoff compatible with the players’ individual rationality (player one’s highest IR
1See Fudenberg and Levine (1989) for the case of perfect monitoring, Fudenberg and Levine (1992) for
imperfect public monitoring, and Gossner (2011) for imperfect private monitoring.
2 We say that a certain type is available if player two believes that player one is this type with positive
probability.
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payoff) in any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. For our reputation result,
we assume that a certain commitment type, which satisfies two properties, is available. The
first property, which we call no shortfall, requires that the type’s commitment payoff is
equal to player one’s highest IR payoff.3 The second requires that the per period cost of
not best responding to this type is positive, even for an arbitrarily patient player two. If
this type is available, then player one guarantees this type’s commitment payoff simply by
mimicking its strategy, even if player two believes that player one is another commitment type
with arbitrarily higher probability. In other words, this commitment type with no shortfall
facilitates reputation building.
For our reputation result, we also assume that the stage game has locally nonconflicting
interests (LNCI).4 There are LNCI in a game if player two’s payoff, in the payoff profile
where player one receives his highest IR payoff, strictly exceeds her pure minimax payoff.
This restriction on the stage game ensure the existence of a commitment type that satisfies
the aforementioned two properties.
One key assumption, which we have not yet discussed at length, is that player one does not
observe player two’s intended action, but only sees an imperfect signal of it, as in a model of
moral hazard. We also assume that the support of the distribution of signals is independent
of how player two plays; we call this the full-support imperfect-monitoring assumption. This
assumption is indispensable and, intuitively, ensures that every reward and punishment in
player one’s strategy will occasionally be triggered, so that player two will learn how player
one responds to all sequences of public outcomes.
We obtain our reputation result by calculating a lower bound, which holds across all
equilibria, on player one’s payoff when he mimics a commitment type that plays a pure
strategy (as in Fudenberg and Levine (1989)). In this context, our assumption that player
one’s stage-game actions are perfectly monitored greatly aids our analysis. This is because
the perfect-monitoring assumption simplifies the dynamics of how player one’s reputation
evolves. In particular, because player two perfectly monitors player one’s stage-game actions
and because the commitment type plays a pure strategy, player one’s reputation level weakly
increases - but only as long as player two observes him play the same stage-game action as
the action the commitment type would have played; otherwise, his reputation level collapses
to zero.5 If we relax the assumption that player one’s actions are perfectly monitored, then a
3The commitment payoff of a type is the payoff that player one can guarantee by publicly committing
to play the repeated-game strategy that this type plays. A type’s (or strategy’s) shortfall is the difference
between player one’s highest IR payoff and the type’s commitment payoff.
4We also assume that the stage-game satisfies a certain technical genericity property. Specifically, we
assume that the payoff profile in which player one obtains his highest IR payoff is unique. We term this
genericity property no gap.
5We use these dynamics in proving both reputation results and our non reputation results.
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technically challenging statistical learning problem arises. Whether an appropriate statistical
learning technique can be developed or applied for this framework remains an open question
beyond the scope of this paper.6,7
Lastly, the reputation results in games with asymmetric discounting (Fudenberg and Levine
(1989, 1992) or Celentani et al. (1996)) are robust to the introduction of two-sided un-
certainty, while the reputation result that we present in this paper is not. In order to
obtain our one-sided reputation result, we allow for only one-sided uncertainty. In other
words, we replace asymmetric discount factors as in Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992) or
Celentani et al. (1996) with one-sided asymmetric information.
1.1. Related literature and our contribution. This paper is most closely related to
work on reputation effects in repeated simultaneous-move games with equally patient agents
(see Cripps and Thomas (1997), Cripps et al. (2005), and Chan (2000)).8 We make three
main contributions to this literature. First, we provide the first reputation result for all
games with a strong Stackelberg action and games LNCI.9 Previous reputation results are
for only a strict subset of stage games with a strong Stackelberg action: those with strictly
conflicting interests (Cripps et al. (2005)) or strictly-dominant-action stage games (Chan
(2000)).10 Second, we are the first to explore reputation effects under imperfect monitoring.
Previous work assumed perfect monitoring. Finally, our work highlights the role that full-
support imperfect monitoring plays for a reputation effect in repeated games with LNCI.
Without full-support imperfect monitoring, our reputation result may fail to obtain for
repeated games with LNCI (Cripps and Thomas (1997) and Chan (2000)).
This paper also relates to work on reputation effects in repeated games where a pa-
tient player one faces a nonmyopic, but arbitrarily less patient, opponent (Schmidt (1993),
Celentani et al. (1996), Aoyagi (1996), Cripps et al. (1996), Evans and Thomas (1997)). In
repeated games where a patient player faces a less patient opponent, Celentani et al. (1996)
and Aoyagi (1996) establish reputation results under full-support imperfect monitoring. How-
6Fudenberg and Levine (1992)’s learning result (Theorem 4.1) does not help in our framework with equally
patient agents.
7Note that we place no restriction on player one’s other commitment types. In fact, we allow player
one’s other commitment types to be any countable set of finite automata including those which play mixed
strategies. For example, if there is a strong Stackelberg action in the stage-game, and the set of player one’s
types is any set of finite automata that includes the simple type that plays the pure strong Stackelberg action
in each period, then player one guarantees his highest IR payoff.
8By equal patience, we mean that the players share the same discount factor. There is also a literature on
reputation effects in repeated games without discounting. See, for example, Cripps and Thomas (1995).
9Atakan and Ekmekci (2011) also present a reputation result for repeated games with LNCI and equally
patient players. However, in that paper the stage game is an extensive-form game of perfect information as
opposed to the simultaneous-move game that we assume here.
10For a precise definition of a strictly-dominant-action stage game, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006),
Page 540.
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ever, as in the case with equal discounting, under perfect monitoring a reputation result is
obtained only in games with conflicting interests (see Schmidt (1993) and Cripps et al. (1996)
for a generalization).
Although the results in repeated games with a less patient opponent are similar in spirit to
the results we establish here, we should point out three important differences. First, against
a less patient opponent, player one can build a reputation by mimicking a commitment type
with positive shortfall, i.e., player one can guarantee a compromise payoff (Celentani et al.
(1996) and Cripps et al. (1996)). In contrast, this is not possible when player one faces an
equally patient opponent. Second, with equally patient agents, the limitation on the types
that facilitate reputation building to those with no shortfall implies a restriction on the class
of stage games (i.e., those with a strong Stackelberg action or LNCI). Again, this contrasts
with the case where player one faces a less patient opponent, as in Celentani et al. (1996).
Because player one can guarantee a compromise payoff against a less patient opponent,
Celentani et al. (1996) are able to establish a reputation result which applies to all stage
games when there is full-support imperfect monitoring. Third, the arguments for reputation
results in repeated games where player one faces a less patient opponent rely on the learning
result (Theorem 4.1) in Fudenberg and Levine (1992). In our framework with equally patient
players, this learning result has no traction. We instead introduce a dynamic-programming
methodology where the state variable is player two’s beliefs.11
This paper is also closely related to Atakan and Ekmekci (2011), which proves a repu-
tation result for repeated extensive-form games of perfect information with equally patient
players. The three main differences between the two papers are as follows: First, in this
paper we study the Bayesian equilibria of repeated simultaneous-move games whereas the
focus of Atakan and Ekmekci (2011) is on the perfect Bayesian equilibria of a repeated game
where the two players never move simultaneously. In particular, the reputation result of
Atakan and Ekmekci (2011) leverages the particular form of sequential rationality, implied
by perfect Bayesian equilibrium for games where the two players move sequentially, in a way
that one cannot if the two players move simultaneously or if the focus is on Bayesian equi-
libria. Two, this paper assumes imperfect monitoring whereas Atakan and Ekmekci (2011)
assumes that both players’ moves are perfectly monitored. Three, here we assume that the
other commitment types (i.e., the commitment types other than the type that player one
mimics) are finite automata but we place no restriction on player two’s prior. In contrast, the
reputation result in Atakan and Ekmekci (2011) depends on the set of other commitment
11Also, see Cripps and Thomas (2003) for an asymptotic contrast of the equilibrium payoff sets of
incomplete-information repeated games where the players share the same discount factor with those games
where the informed player is arbitrarily more patient than his opponent.
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types having sufficiently low prior probability.
2. The model
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a finite, two-player, simultaneous-move
stage game Γ is played in periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}. The players discount payoffs using a
common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1). For any set X, ∆(X) denotes the set of all probability
distribution functions over X. The set of pure actions for player i in the stage game is Ai,
and the set of mixed stage-game actions is ∆(Ai). After each period, player two’s stage-game
action is imperfectly observed through a public signal while player one’s pure stage-game
action is perfectly observed.12 Let Y denote the set of public signals generated by player two’s
actions. Thus, after each period, a public signal (a1, y) ∈ A1×Y is observed. The probability
of signal y if player two chooses action a2 ∈ A2 is πy(a2). For any mixed action α2 ∈ ∆(A2),
πy(α2) :=
∑
a2∈A2
α2(a2)πy(a2). We maintain the following full-support imperfect-monitoring
assumption throughout the paper:
Assumption (FS) Define π := min(a2,y)∈A2×Y πy(a2). We assume that π > 0.
If the stage game satisfies FS, then player one is never exactly sure about player two’s
action. The assumption does not, however, put any limits on the degree of imperfect moni-
toring.13
In the stage game, the payoff for any player i is given by the function ri : A1 × Y → R
and depends only on publicly observed outcomes a1 and y. Let M = max{|ri(a1, y)| : i ∈
{1, 2}, a1 ∈ A1, y ∈ Y }. The payoff function for player i is gi(a1, a2) :=
∑
y∈Y ri(a1, y)πy(a2)
for (a1, a2) ∈ A1 × A2. The mixed minimax payoff for player i is gˆi, and the pure minimax
payoff for player i is gˆpi . Let a
p
1 ∈ A1 be such that g2(a
p
1, a2) ≤ gˆ
p
2 for all a2 ∈ A2. The set of
feasible payoffs F is the convex hull of the set {g1(a1, a2), g2(a1, a2) : (a1, a2) ∈ A1×A2} ; and
the set of feasible and individually-rational payoffs is G = F ∩ {(g1, g2) : g1 ≥ gˆ1, g2 ≥ gˆ2}.
Let g¯1 = max{g1 : (g1, g2) ∈ G}; hence, g¯1 is player one’s highest payoff compatible with the
players’ individual rationality (player one’s highest IR payoff).
In the repeated game Γ∞, the players have perfect recall and can observe past out-
comes. The set of period t public histories is H t = At1 × Y
t, a typical element is ht =
(a01, y
0, a11, y
1, ..., at−11 , y
t−1) for t > 0, and h0 = ∅. The set of all public histories is H =
12 If player one plays a mixed action, then only the pure action that he eventually chooses is observed
publicly. The mixed action he uses is not observed.
13 In extensive-form stage games, where player one’s pure action is a full contingent plan, the perfect
monitoring assumption that we impose is stringent. This is because it requires that player one’s whole
contingent plan be observed at the end of the period. We can relax this assumption by requiring that player
one’s moves are observed perfectly while player two’s moves are observed with full-support noise. The results
we present in this paper go through with this weaker assumption, and we discuss this further in section ??.
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⋃∞
t=0H
t. The set of period t private histories for player two is H t2 = A
t
1×A
t
2× Y
t , a typical
element is ht2 = (a
0
1, a
0
2, y
0, ..., at−11 , a
t−1
2 , y
t−1), and H2 =
⋃∞
t=0H
t
2 is the set of all private
histories for player two. The set of private histories of player one coincides with the public
histories, i.e., H t1 = H
t.
2.1. Types and strategies. A behavior strategy for player i is a function σi : Hi →
∆(Ai), and Σi is the set of all behavior strategies for player i. A behavior strategy chooses
a mixed stage-game action given player i′s period t private history. A behavior strategy for
player i is a function σi : Hi → ∆(Ai) and Σi is the set of all behavior strategies for player
i.14 We use σ to denote a strategy profile (σ1(N), σ2) and the set of all such strategy profiles
is Σ = Σ1 × Σ2.
For any strategy σ1 ∈ Σ1, H(σ1) denotes the set of public histories that are compatible
with σ1. More precisely, h
T = (y0, a01, ..., y
T−1, aT−11 ) ∈ H(σ1) if and only if a
k
1 ∈ supp(σ1(h
k))
for all k ≤ T −1, where hk is any history that is identical to the first k periods of hT . For any
period t public history ht and for any σi ∈ Σi, the expression σi|ht denotes the continuation
strategy induced by ht. The probability measure over the set of (infinite) histories induced
by (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 is Pr(σ1,σ2).
Before time 0, nature selects player one as a normal type N or a commitment type ω,
from an at most countable set of types Ω ⊂ Σ1 ∪{N} according to a prior µ that is common
knowledge. Each type ω ∈ Ω \ {N} is committed to playing the repeated-game strategy
ω ∈ Σ1. Player two is known to be a normal type with certainty and she maximizes her
expected discounted payoffs. Player two’s belief over player one’s types, µ : H → ∆(Ω), is a
probability measure over Ω after each period t public history.
A finite automaton ω = (Θ, θ0, o, τ) consists of a finite set of states Θ, an initial state
θ0 ∈ Θ, an output function o : Θ→ ∆(A1) that assigns a (possibly mixed) stage-game action
to each state, and a transition function τ : Y ×A1×Θ→ Θ that determines the transitions
across states as a function of the outcomes of the stage game. Abusing notation, we denote
the strategy that an automaton induces by the automaton itself. For any finite automaton ω
and any history ht ∈ H(ω), θ(ht) denotes the unique state θ which is the automaton’s state
at history ht. A pure-strategy finite automaton is a finite automaton ω = (Θ, θ0, o, τ), where
the output function o is deterministic. For a finite automaton ω, a state θ ∈ Θ is recurrent
if θ is visited infinitely often under the probability measure Pr(ω,σ2) for any σ2 ∈ Σ2. A finite
automaton is irreducible if all of its states are recurrent (see Definition A.1 in the appendix).
For any particular commitment type ω ∈ Ω, let w(ht) = {ω′ : ω′|ht = ω|ht}; in words,
w(ht) denotes the set of types that play the same repeated-game strategy as type ω plays
14For player one, any behavior strategy is also a public behavior strategy because H1 = H .
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after history ht. Consequently, Σ1 \ {ω} is the set of commitment types other than ω, and
Σ1 \ ω(h
t) is the set of commitment types that play a strategy that is not identical to the
strategy of ω, given that history ht has been reached.
Given automaton ω = (Θ, θ0, o, τ), we say that player two’s strategy σ2 is stationary with
respect to ω if σ2(h
t) = σ2(h
k) for any two histories ht and hk such that θ(hk) = θ(ht) ∈ Θ,
where θ(hk) = τ(ak−11 , y
k−1, θ(hk−1)) and θ(h0) = θ0. Abusing notation slightly, we will
denote a stationary strategy by a function σ2 : Θ → ∆(A2), i.e., player two plays mixed
action σ2(θ) whenever the state of ω is θ.
2.2. Payoffs. A player’s repeated-game payoff is the normalized discounted sum of the
stage-game payoffs. For any infinite public history h, define ui(h, δ) = (1− δ)
∑∞
k=0 δ
kri(a
k
1, y
k),
and ui(h
−t, δ) = (1− δ)
∑∞
k=t δ
k−tri(a
k
1, y
k), where h−t = (at1, y
t, at+11 , y
t+1, ...). Player one
and player two’s expected continuation payoffs, following a period t public history ht and
under strategy profile σ = ({ω}ω∈Ω\{N}, σ1(N), σ2), are given by the following two equations,
respectively:
U1(σ, δ|h
t) = U1(σ1(N), σ2, δ|h
t),
U2(σ, δ, µ|h
t) =
∑
ω∈Ω\{N}
µ(ω|ht)U2(ω, σ2, δ|h
t) + µ(N |ht)U2(σ1(N), σ2, δ|h
t),
where Ui(ω, σ2, δ|h
t) = E(ω,σ2)[ui(h
−t, δ)|ht] is the expectation over continuation histories h−t
with respect to Pr(ω|ht ,σ2|ht). Also, U1(σ, δ) = U1(σ, δ|h
0) and U2(σ, δ, µ) = U2(σ, δ, µ|h
0).
2.3. Repeated game and equilibrium. The repeated game of complete information,
that is, the repeated game without any commitment types, with discount factor equal to
δ ∈ [0, 1), is denoted as Γ∞(δ). The repeated game of incomplete information, with the
prior over the set of commitment types given by µ ∈ ∆(Ω) and the discount factor equal to
δ ∈ [0, 1), is denoted as Γ∞(µ, δ).
The analysis in this paper focuses on Bayesian Nash equilibria (NE) of the game of incom-
plete information Γ∞(µ, δ). In particular, a pair of strategies (σ1(N), σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 is a NE
of Γ∞(µ, δ) if σ1(N) ∈ argmaxσ1∈Σ1 U1(σ1, σ2, δ) and σ2 ∈ argmaxσ2∈Σ2 U2(σ1(N), σ2, δ, µ).
Let
UNE1 (δ, µ) = inf{U1(σ, δ) : σ ∈ NE(Γ
∞(δ, µ))},
where NE(Γ∞(δ, µ)) denotes the set of all NE of the repeated game Γ∞(δ, µ). In words,
UNE1 (δ, µ) is player one’s the worst NE payoff. Also, let U
NE
1 (µ) = lim infδ→1 U
NE
1 (δ, µ).
Again in words, UNE1 (µ) is the worst NE payoff for a patient player one.
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Remark 1 Suppose σ is a NE strategy profile of Γ∞(µ, δ).
(i). FS implies that if ht ∈ H(N), then Prσ(h
t) > 0, that is, if ht is compatible with player
one’s strategy, then it has positive probability under σ. This is because, under FS, any
finite sequence of signals has positive probability regardless of which strategy player two
uses.
(ii). For any history ht ∈ H, if ht has positive probability under σ, that is, if Prσ(h
t) > 0,
then (σ1|ht , σ2|ht) is a NE profile of Γ
∞(µ(ht), δ), where µ(ht) is the posterior belief
over player one’s types given history ht.
(iii). Consequently, if ht ∈ H(N), then (σ1(N)|ht , σ2|ht) is a NE profile of Γ
∞(µ(ht), δ), i.e.,
(σ1(N)|ht, σ2|ht) is a NE profile of the continuation game.
2.4. Commitment payoff and shortfall of a strategy. The commitment payoff of a
repeated-game strategy σ is the payoff that a patient player one can guarantee through
public commitment to this strategy. The formal definition is as follows:
Definition (Commitment Payoff) For any repeated-game strategy σ1, define
UC1 (σ1, δ|h
t) = min{U1(σ1, σ2, δ|h
t) : σ2 ∈ BR(σ1, δ)},
where BR(σ1, δ) denotes the set of best responses of player two to σ1 in the repeated game
of complete information Γ∞(δ). The commitment payoff of a repeated-game strategy σ1 after
history ht is defined as UC1 (σ1|h
t) = lim infδ→1 U
C
1 (σ1, δ|h
t).15
The shortfall of a repeated-game strategy σ is the difference between the commitment
payoff of the strategy and player one’s highest IR payoff. The shortfall of a commitment
type is an important concept in our analysis because, as we show, only those types with no
shortfall can facilitate successful reputation building for player one. The formal definition is
as follows:
Definition (Shortfall) The shortfall of a repeated-game strategy σ1 is defined as follows:
d(σ1) = g¯1 − sup
ht∈H(σ1)
UC1 (σ1|h
t).
A type ω has no shortfall if d(ω) = 0, i.e., if the best commitment payoff among all histories
for type ω is equal to player one’s highest IR payoff.
15 Although we define the commitment payoff using lim infδ→1 U
C
1
(σ1, δ|ht), in the context of this paper
the limit limδ→1 U
C
1
(σ1, δ|ht) exists.
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If the shortfall of the commitment type ω is positive, then there is typically a range of
feasible and individually-rational payoffs for player two, given that player one receives UC1 (ω)
(see figure 1).
d(ω)
g¯1
b
b
b
b
b
UC1 (ω)
g′′2
g′2
(gˆ1, gˆ2)
P2
P1
Figure 1: Shortfall of a strategy. Player two can receive any payoff between g′2 and g
′′
2 while
player one receives UC1 (ω).
2.5. Class of stage games. Below we define the various restrictions on the set of stage
games that we will utilize in the remainder of the paper. We say a game has no gap if the
payoff profile where player one receives his highest IR payoff is unique. The formal definition
is as follows:
Definition (No gap) Let gb2 = max{g2 : (g¯1, g2) ∈ G}. A stage game has no gap if
(g¯1, g2) ∈ G implies that g2 = g
b
2. Otherwise, we say that the stage game has a positive gap.
For our reputation result we assume that the stage game has no gap, an assumption that
is generically satisfied. The implication of the assumption is as follows: If the stage game has
no gap, then there are linear bounds on the feasible payoffs for player two that pass through
the point (g¯1, g
b
2); hence, player two’s payoffs are in a narrow range if player one’s payoff is
close to g¯1. In contrast, if the stage game has a positive gap, then there is a range of payoffs
that are feasible and individually rational for player two if player one’s payoff is equal to g¯1
(see figure 2).
Our main reputation result focuses on stage games that have either a strong Stackelberg
action or LNCI, and we denote the set of such stage games by G. A stage game has LNCI
9
bb
b
b
g¯1
gb2
gb2 − γ
(gˆ1, gˆ2)
γ
P2
P1
(a) A game with a positive gap: there is
a range of feasible payoffs that player two
can receive while player one receives g¯1.
g¯1
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b
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(gˆ1, gˆ2)
P2
P1
(b) A game with no gap: The set F is
bounded by the lines that go through
(g¯1, g
b
2). Hence, player two’s feasible
payoffs are in a narrow range if player
one’s payoff is close to g¯1.
Figure 2: The gap of a game.
if player two’s payoff is strictly higher than her pure strategy minimax in the payoff profile
where player one receives his highest IR payoff. The formal definitions of a strong Stackelberg
action and LNCI are as follows:
Definition (LNCI) For any g ∈ G, if g1 = g¯1, then g2 > gˆ
p
2.
Definition (Strong Stackelberg action) There exists as1 ∈ A1 such that any best re-
sponse to as1 yields player one a payoff equal to g¯1.
If player one has a strong Stackelberg action in Γ, then there is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of Γ where player one plays the strong Stackelberg action as1, player two best
responds to as1, and player one’s payoff is equal to g¯1. The battle-of-the-sexes (figure 3d),
the common-interest game (figure 3a), and the chain-store game (figure 3c) all have strong
Stackelberg actions. The stage-game actions U , F , and A are strong Stackelberg actions for
the battle-of-the-sexes, the common-interest game, and the chain-store game, respectively.
In contrast, the principal-agent game (figure 3b) has LNCI but does not have a strong
Stackelberg action. In this game, player one gets his highest IR payoff in the action profile
(U,W ). However, W is not a best response to U because player two would rather play S.
We will establish our main reputation result for stage games in G with no gap. The two
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U 1, 0 1/2,−1
D 0,−1 1/2,−1
(a) Common-interest game.
W (ork) S(hirk)
U 3, 1 0, 2
D 0, 0 0, 0
(b) Principal-agent game.
I(n) O(ut)
F (ight) −1,−2 4, 0
A(ccom.) 2, 1 4, 0
(c) Chain-store game.
A B
A 2, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 2
(d) The battle-of-the-sexes.
Figure 3: Stage games with a strong Stackelberg action (3a, 3d, and 3c) or a game with
LNCI but without a Stackelberg action (3b).
main implications of these restrictions, which we utilize heavily in proving our reputation
result, are as follows: First, as we discussed above, if Γ has no gap, then player two’s payoffs
are in a narrow range whenever player one’s payoff is close to g¯1. Second, if Γ is in G, i.e., if
Γ has a strong Stackelberg action or LNCI, then there is a type ω∗ which has the following
two properties:
First, ω∗ has no shortfall, that is, ω∗’s commitment payoff is equal to player one’s highest
IR payoff. For example, in the battle-of-the-sexes (figure 3d), ω∗ is the commitment type
which plays A in each period. Playing A is player two’s unique best response to ω∗, and
hence ω∗ is equal to player one’s highest IR payoff. Second, the unit cost to a sufficiently
patient player two of forcing a player one who is playing ω∗ to receive a payoff less than g¯1
is strictly positive. For example, in the battle-of-the-sexes, in each period that player two
forces ω∗ to get a payoff of one (which is a unit short of g¯1 = 2) by playing B instead of A,
she also loses a payoff equal to one.
Therefore, for stage games in G with no gap we have the following: if player one’s repeated-
game payoff is close to the commitment payoff of ω∗ (i.e., g¯1), then player two’s feasible and
individually rational repeated-game payoffs are in a narrow range determined by linear bounds
that pass through (g¯1, g
b
2). Moreover, if player one is committed to playing strategy ω
∗, then
the unit cost to a patient player two of forcing him to receive a repeated-game payoff less
than g¯1 is strictly positive for a patient player two.
The games that have a strong Stackelberg action are prominent in our analysis when all of
player one’s commitment types are finite automata. This is because if the stage game satisfies
has a strong Stackelberg action, then there is a pure strategy finite automaton ω∗ with no
shortfall; moreover, choosing not to best respond to this commitment type is costly for player
two. To see this, consider a game that has a strong Stackelberg action and the pure-strategy
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finite automaton that plays as1 in each period of the repeated game. It is straightforward to
see that any best response to ω∗ gives player one a payoff equal to g¯1, that is, ω
∗ has no
shortfall. For example, in the battle-of-the-sexes (figure 3d), ω∗ plays A in each period and
player two’s unique best response to ω∗ entails playing A in each period. Moreover, choosing
not to best respond to ω∗ is strictly costly for player two. This is because if player two plays
B instead of A in any period, then she gets zero instead of one against ω∗, i.e., the cost of
choosing not to best respond is equal to one.
As we discussed above, there is a pure-strategy finite automaton with no shortfall if the
stage game has a strong Stackelberg action. The following lemma, which is proved in appendix
A, shows that the converse is also true: if the stage game does not have a strong Stackelberg
action, then a pure-strategy finite automaton with no shortfall does not exist. Nevertheless,
in Theorem 1 and in section 3.1 we show that there is an infinite automaton with no shortfall
if the stage game is in G.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Γ satisfies FS and has no gap. There exists a pure strategy finite
automaton with no shortfall if and only if Γ has a strong Stackelberg action.
Proof: See Atakan and Ekmekci (2012), Lemma 1. 
For an intuition about the “only if” part of the above lemma, consider the principal-agent
game (figure 3b). Player one’s highest IR payoff is equal to three in this game. If player two’s
actions were observed without noise, then player one could obtain a payoff equal to three by
using the following repeated-game strategy: player one starts the game by playing U ; if player
two does not play W in any period in which player one plays U , then player one punishes
player two for two periods by playing D; after the two periods of punishment, player one
again plays U . The best response of a sufficiently patient player two to this repeated-game
strategy involves playing W in any period where player one plays U .
However, if player two’s actions are monitored with noise, then for player one to commit to
the strategy described in the previous paragraph does not necessarily guarantee him a high
payoff. This is because player one cannot observe whether player two has playedW or S when
he plays U but can observe only an imperfect signal. Consequently, in certain periods player
one will mistakenly punish player two, even if she played W against U ; or he will mistakenly
fail to punish player two, even if she played S against U . Thus, player one cannot guarantee
a payoff equal to three. The situation is also similar with any other finite automaton. Any
finite automaton ω whose commitment payoff is equal to three must punish player two by
playing D if player two plays W against U . However, the finite automaton will punish player
two even if player two plays W in each period because player two’s actions are monitored
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with noise. Thus, player one’s payoff from strategy ω will remain strictly below three even
if player two plays W in each period. However, even though there is no finite automaton
with no shortfall for the principal-agent game, in Theorem 1 and in section 3.1 we show that
there is always an infinite automaton with no shortfall that facilitates reputation building if
the stage game is in G and, consequently, for the principal-agent game.
3. Reputation effects
In this section we present our main reputation result. Recall that the set G contains all
games that have a strong Stackelberg action or LNCI. Our main reputation result, which
applies to stage games in G that have no gap, is as follows. The proof of this theorem is in
appendix B.3.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the stage game Γ is an element of G, satisfies FS, and has no
gap. There exists a commitment type ω∗ such that if µ(ω∗) > 0 and if Ω−ω∗ is a set of finite
automata, then UNE1 (µ) = U
C
1 (ω
∗) = g¯1.
Under the stated assumption, Theorem 1 establishes that there exists a particular com-
mitment type ω∗ such that if this commitment type is available for player one to mimic (i.e.,
µ(ω∗) > 0) and if all the other commitment types are finite automata, then a patient player
one can guarantee a payoff equal to the commitment payoff of ω∗ in all NE. Moreover, the
commitment payoff of ω∗ is equal to player one’s highest IR payoff. To establish Theorem
1, we use Lemma 2 stated below. This lemma, which is proved in appendix B.2, provides a
lower bound on player one’s NE payoffs as a function of the commitment payoff, the shortfall,
and the prior probability of any irreducible pure-strategy finite automata.
Lemma 2 Suppose that Γ satisfies FS and has no gap, and suppose that all the commitment
types are finite automata. For any irreducible pure-strategy finite automaton ω ∈ Ω, if µ(ω) >
0, then
UNE1 (µ) ≥ U
C
1 (ω)− f(ω, µ(ω))d(ω),
where f is a positive-valued function as defined in equation (3) in the appendix, which satisfies
limx→0 f(ω, x) =∞.
Proof: See Atakan and Ekmekci (2012), Theorem 1. 
To better understand Lemma 2, suppose that Γ satisfies FS and has no gap. Also, suppose
that Ω = {N,ω∗} where ω∗ is an irreducible pure-strategy finite automaton. We will investi-
gate the implications of Lemma 2 in two cases. First, suppose that the commitment type ω∗
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has no shortfall (i.e., d(ω∗) = 0 and therefore UC1 (ω
∗) = g¯1). In this case, if ω
∗ is available
(i.e., µ(ω∗) > 0), then Lemma 2 shows that player one can guarantee his highest IR payoff
in any NE. In other words, Lemma 2 delivers a reputation result because it establishes that
UNE1 (µ
∗) ≥ UC1 (ω
∗) = g¯1 if ω
∗ is available and if d(ω∗) = 0.
Now suppose that ω∗ has a positive shortfall (i.e., d(ω∗) > 0). In this case, the lower bound
that Lemma 2 provides is vacuous if µ(ω∗) is sufficiently small. This is because Lemma 2
implies only that UNE1 (µ) ≥ U
C
1 (ω
∗) − f(ω∗, µ(ω∗))d(ω). However, if µ(ω∗) goes to zero,
then f(ω∗, µ(ω∗)) approaches infinity and therefore, UC1 (ω
∗)− f(ω∗, µ(ω∗))d(ω) approaches
negative infinity.
In summary, Lemma 2 delivers a reputation result (that is, the mere availability of type
ω∗ guarantees player one a high payoff in any NE) if ω∗ has no shortfall and if Γ has no gap.
Otherwise, Lemma 2 does not provide a meaningful lower bound on player one’s NE payoff
when the chosen commitment type is sufficiently unlikely.
As the above discussion suggests, Lemma 2 depends on the existence of a pure strategy
finite automaton with no shortfall; in turn, the existence of such a finite automaton crucially
depends on the properties of the stage game under consideration (Lemma 1). In particular, if
the stage game has a strong Stackelberg action, then the commitment type ω∗, which plays
as1 in every period of the repeated game, is a pure-strategy finite automaton with no shortfall.
Therefore, Lemma 2 immediately delivers a reputation result for stage games with no gap
that have a strong Stackelberg action: if all the commitment types are finite automata and
if type ω∗ is available, then player one can guarantee type ω∗’s commitment payoff which is
equal to g¯1 in any NE. In other words, player one can guarantee his highest IR payoff if the
set of commitment types is sufficiently rich that ω∗ is available. For example, the set of types
is sufficiently rich if all types which play the same action in every period are available or,
more generally, if all the pure-strategy finite automata are available. The following corollary
summarizes this:
Corollary 1 Suppose that Γ satisfies FS, has a strong Stackelberg action, and has no gap;
and suppose that all the commitment types are finite automata. Let ω∗ denote the commitment
type which plays as1 in each period of the repeated game. If µ(ω
∗) > 0, then UNE1 (µ) ≥ g¯1.
Proof: See Atakan and Ekmekci (2012), Corollary 1. 
For stage games that do not have a strong Stackelberg action, there is no pure-strategy
finite automaton which has no shortfall (see Lemma 1). Therefore, Lemma 2 does not deliver a
reputation result for such games. Nevertheless, our main reputation result, stated as Theorem
1, is for all stage games in G with no gap, and not just for those which satisfy SA. These
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findings are reconciled as follows: We establish the reputation result for stage games that do
not have a strong Stackelberg action by first constructing a commitment type with infinitely
many states that has no shortfall. We then show that player one can guarantee this type’s
commitment payoff if this particular type is available. In section 3.1 below we discuss how
we use Lemma 2 as an intermediate step to prove a reputation result for stage games that
do not have a strong Stackelberg action.
3.1. Games without a strong Stackelberg action. The proof of Theorem 1 shows
that, for any stage-game in G with no gap which does not have a strong Stackelberg action,
there exists a commitment type with no shortfall. In this case, however, the commitment type
ω∗ is an automaton with an infinite number of states. Moreover, Theorem 1 demonstrates
that player one can guarantee a payoff equal to g¯1 by simply mimicking ω
∗. In this section,
we sketch how we construct this commitment type by describing ω∗ for the principle-agent
game which does not have a strong Stackelberg action (figure 3b).
As a first step in describing the infinite automaton ω∗, we describe a finite automaton
ωǫ which plays a review strategy with shortfall ǫ > 0 (see also Radner (1981, 1985) and
Celentani et al. (1996)). The finite automaton ωǫ has two phases: a review phase and a
punishment phase. Each review phase lasts for J(ǫ) periods and the automaton plays U
in each period of the review phase. Each punishment phase lasts for 2J(ǫ) periods and the
automaton plays D in each period of the punishment phase. The automaton begins the game
in the review phase. If player one’s average payoff in a review phase is at least 3−ξ(ǫ), where
ξ(ǫ) > 0 is the cutoff value for the review, then ωǫ enters a new review phase. Otherwise, ωǫ
moves to a punishment phase and plays D, i.e., minimaxes player two, for 2J(ǫ) periods. At
the end of that punishment phase, the automaton again returns to a review phase.
Notice that, had there been perfect monitoring, a patient player two who faces ωǫ would
have strictly preferred playing W in each period in order to avoid ever entering the punish-
ment phase. Under imperfect monitoring a patient player two’s incentives are similar to the
case of perfect monitoring, but only for appropriately chosen J(ǫ) and ξ(ǫ). In particular,
for any ǫ, we pick the length J(ǫ) of the review stage and the cutoff value ξ(ǫ) such that a
sufficiently patient player two’s best response to ωǫ entails entering the punishment phase
after a review phase with arbitrarily small probability; a patient player one’s repeated game
payoff is thus at least 3− ǫ.16 In other words, the commitment payoff of ωǫ is at least 3− ǫ.
The type ω∗ first plays T1 repetitions of a review strategy with shortfall ǫ where each
repetition includes the review phase and, if it is triggered, the subsequent punishment phase.
Then ω∗ plays T2 repetitions of the review strategy with shortfall ǫ/2, and then Tn repetitions
16See Celentani et al. (1996) which shows that J(ǫ) and ξ can indeed be chosen in this way.
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B(uy) N(ot Buy)
H(igh) 2,−1 0, 0
L(ow) 1, 1 0, 0
Figure 4: A product choice game.
of the review strategy with shortfall ǫ/n; and so on. As δ approaches one, the commitment
payoff of type ω∗ converges to three, i.e., the shortfall of ω∗ is equal to zero. This is because,
for any n ≥ 1, the initial periods in which ω∗ plays a review strategy with a shortfall more
than ǫ/n become payoff-irrelevant as the discount factor approaches one.
The choice of how many repetitions Tn are played by ω
∗ of each review strategy with
shortfall ǫ/n is delicate. In the appendix, we make the choices in a way that ensures that
our reputation result applies. Intuitively, we choose the number of repetitions to ensure the
following three conditions hold: first, UC1 (ω
∗, δ) is increasing in δ; second, the cost of not best
responding to this type is strictly positive for any δ; third, player two can distinguish the
strategy of ω∗ from any finite automaton’s strategy regardless of which strategy she plays.
3.2. Games outside of the class G. A stage game falls outside of the class G if the payoff
profile in which player one receives his highest IR payoff is equal to his pure minimax payoff
but the game does not have a strong Stackelberg Action. A prominent example of a game
that falls outside of the class G is the product-choice game depicted in figure 4. In this game
player one’s highest IR payoff is equal to 1.5, player two receives her minimax payoff (zero)
in the unique payoff profile in which player one gets 1.5, and the game has no gap. However,
there is no action, whether pure or mixed, such that committing to it would guarantee player
one a payoff equal to 1.5 in this game.17 We discuss the repeated product-choice game to
illustrate what can go wrong in games outside of the class G.
This game is does not have a strong Stackelberg action; hence, we cannot obtain a reputa-
tion result with pure-strategy finite automata. In addition, an argument similar to Lemma
1 implies that any finite automata, including one that plays a mixed strategy, has a positive
shortfall. However, consider the type ω that plays H with probability 1/2+(1/2)2 in periods
{1, ..., 4}, plays H with probability 1/2 + (1/2)3 in periods {5, ..., 8}, and more generally
plays H with probability 1/2 + (1/2)k in periods {2(k−1) + 1, ..., 2k}. Player two’s unique
best response to ω is to play B in each period. Moreover, the commitment payoff of this
type UC1 (ω) is equal to 1.5 (player one’s highest IR payoff). Consequently, ω is an infinite
17 Player one gets 1.5 if he plays H and L with equal probability and if player two best responds by
playing B. However, both B and N are best responses for player two, and if she best responds by playing
N instead of B, then player one’s payoff is equal to zero. Therefore, player one cannot guarantee 1.5 by
committing to play H and L with equal probability.
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automaton with no shortfall.
Suppose that ω is the only commitment type available for player one to mimic. Even
though ω has no shortfall, our reputation result does not apply here. This is because the
type ω uses a mixed strategy. And, as we explained in the introduction, our approach is
unable to provide a reputation bound for types that play mixed strategies.
Now, for the sake of argument, suppose that player one’s stage-game action is to choose
the probability p ∈ [0, 1] with which he plays H , and that player two observes his choice of
p at the end of each period. Given this modification, ω plays a pure strategy.18 Even under
this modification, however, our reputation result still does not apply. This is because the cost
to player two of playing action N instead of best responding to ω by playing B converges
to zero as player two becomes increasingly patient. Consequently, a patient player two can
resist playing a best response to ω at no cost to herself, and can thereby make it sufficiently
difficult for player one to build a reputation.
Without this modification, one can also imagine a pure-strategy dynamic type that plays
H in portion p of periods of a block of periods, plays L in the remaining periods of the
block, and minimaxes player two for an appropriate number of periods if she fails to play
B in many periods in the block. The length of the blocks and the length of the punishment
periods can be carefully chosen to ensure that this dynamic type has a commitment payoff
equal to 1.5. However, a patient player two can again resist best responding to this type at
no cost to herself. Whether a reputation result can be established for this game is an open
question.
A. Finite automata and learning
In this part of the appendix we prove some auxiliary results concerning finite automata
which we repeatedly use in our subsequent arguments. Also, we prove our main learning
result which we state as Lemma A.2. Our main learning result and its corollary, that we
state as Corollary A.1, play central roles in the proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 presented
in Appendix B.
Fix a pure strategy finite automata ω∗ ∈ Ω and a finite subset W ⊂ Σ1. Consider a new
finite set of states Θ, which is the product of the set of states of W and ω∗ with typical
element ~θ = (θω∗ , θ1, ..., θ|W |). In the following development, we fix player one’s strategy ω
∗,
but the strategy of player 2, σ2 varies. Notice that a period t public history h
t uniquely
identifies the state ~θt that the types are in at the start of period t. Let a∗(~θ) denote the pure
stage game action ω∗ plays in state θω∗ . Every strategy profile (ω
∗, σ2) generates a stochastic
18 A mixed strategy is then a probability distribution over choices of p ∈ [0, 1], i.e., a mixed strategy is
an element of ∆([0, 1]).
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process over the vector of states. In particular, the transition are given by the following
equation:
~θt+1 =
(
τ(ω, y, a∗(~θt), θtω)
)
ω∈W∪{ω∗}
≡ ~τ(y, ~θt).
Let Pr(~θt+n|~θt, ht, σ2) denote the probability that the state in period t+n is equal to ~θ
t+n ∈ Θ
given that the state in period t is equal to ~θt, the game is at history ht and player two is
using strategy σ2. For example, when n = 1,
Pr(~θt+1|~θt, ht, σ2) ≡
∑
y∈{y:~τ (y,~θt)=~θt+1}
∑
a2∈A2
πy(a2)σ2(a2, h
t)
In other words, Pr(~θt+1|~θt, ht, σ2) is the transition probability that governs the evolution
of the states.
Definition A.1 (Recurrence and Transience) A state ~θ∗ is transient if, given that the
initial state is ~θ∗, there is a non-zero probability (in Pr(ω∗,σ2)) that the state
~θ∗ is never visited
again. A state is recurrent if it is not transient. A subset of states Θj ⊂ Θ is a recurrent
class if for each ~θ′, ~θ′′ ∈ Θj there exists an n > 0 such that Pr(~θt+n = ~θ′|~θt = ~θ′′, ht, σ2) > 0
for all ht, and for each ~θ′′ ∈ Θj and ~θ′ /∈ Θj we have Pr(~θt+n = ~θ′|~θt = ~θ′′, ht, σ2) = 0 for
all ht and all n > 0. A subset of states Θ0 ⊂ Θ is a transitory class if each ~θ ∈ Θ0 is a
transient state. A finite automaton is irreducible if its states form a single recurrent class.
Lemma A.1 Assume that Γ satisfies FS. For any ~θ′ ∈ Θj and n > 0 we have Pr(~θt+n =
~θ′|~θt = ~θ(ht), ht, σ2) > 0 for some σ2 and h
t if and only if Pr(~θk+n = ~θ′|~θk = ~θ(hˆk), hˆk, σ′2) > 0
for all k ≥ 0, σ′2, and all hˆ
k such that ~θ(hˆk) = ~θ(ht). Consequently, the finite set of possible
states Θ can be uniquely partitioned into a transitory class Θ0, and a collection of disjoint
recurrent classes Θj such that Θ = ∪Mi=0Θ
i; and this partition is independently of σ2.
Proof: FS implies that the probability to transition from ~θt+1 to ~θt after history ht is
bounded from below as follows:
Pr(~θt+1|~θt, ht, σ2) =
∑
y∈{y:~τ(y,~θt)=~θt+1}
∑
a2∈A2
πy(a2)σ2(a2, h
t)
≥
∑
y∈{y:~τ (y,~θt)=~θt+1}
π = |{y : ~τ (y, ~θt) = ~θt+1}|π
So FS implies that Pr(~θt+1|~θt, ht, σ2) > 0 if and only if |{y : ~τ (y, ~θ
t) = ~θt+1}| ≥ 1. But if
|{y : ~τ (y, ~θt) = ~θt+1}| ≥ 1 then Pr(~θk+1|~θt(hˆk), hˆk, σ′2) ≥ |{y : ~τ (y,
~θt) = ~θt+1}|π ≥ π > 0
for any hˆk such that ~θ(hˆk) = ~θk. Iterating this argument generalizes the above to the case
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of n > 1. Also, see Billingsley (1995), Chapter 1, Section 8, or Stokey et al. (1989), Chapter
11.1 for more on partitioning the set of states. 
Definition A.2 (Speed of learning between ω∗ and W ) Let
p¯(ω∗,W ) := max~θ∈{p(ω∗,ω,~θt)6=1,ω∈W} p(ω,
~θ),
where p(ω∗, ω, ~θt) := o(ω, a∗(~θt), θtω). That is, p(ω
∗, ω, ~θt) is the probability that type ω plays
the same action as ω∗ in state ~θt (a∗(~θt)) and p¯(ω∗,W ) is the maximum of p(ω∗, ω, ~θ) over the
set of types W and the set of states where p(ω, ω∗, ~θ) differs from 1. Notice that p¯(ω∗,W ) <
1.19
Define the likelihood ratio recursively as Lωt (h) = p(ω,
~θt(h))Lωt−1(h) and let L
ω
0 (h) =
Lω0 = µ(ω)/µ(ω
∗). Hence, Lωt (h) = µ(ω|h
t)/µ(ω∗|ht) and (Lωt , h
t) is a supermartingale under
Pr(ω∗,σ2) (Fudenberg and Levine (1992) Lemma 4.1). Also, let L
W
0 = µ(W )/µ(ω
∗).
Lemma A.2 Assume that Γ satisfies FS and p¯(ω∗,W ) ≤ ξ ∈ [0, 1). For any ǫ > 0 and
φ > 0 there exists T (|Θ|, |W |, ξ, ǫ, φ) such that
Pr(ω∗,σ2)
{
h :
µ(W−ω∗(ht)|h
t)
µ(ω∗|ht)
< φLW0
}
> 1− ǫ,
for any t > T (|Θ|, |W |, ξ, ǫ, φ), any µ such that µ(ω∗) > 0, and any strategy σ2 of player two.
Proof: For any nonnegative integer k and even number l let E(l, k) denote the set
of infinite histories such that for any h ∈ E(l, k) the process has entered a recurrent
class Θi(h) ⊂ Θ by period l/2 and all states ~θ ∈ Θi(h) have been visited at least k
times by period l. For each nonnegative integer k and ǫ > 0 there exists l(k, |Θ|, ǫ) such
that Pr(ω∗,σ2){E(l(k, |Θ|, ǫ), k)} > 1 − ǫ for any σ2. This is because FS implies that the
probability the process enters a recurrent class after |Θ| periods is at least π|Θ|. FS also
implies that for any two states ~θ′ and ~θ′′ in the same recurrent class Θj we have that
Pr(~θt+|Θ
j | = ~θ′|~θt = ~θ′′, ht, σ2) > π
|Θj | ≥ π|Θ| for any ht and any σ2.
Let k∗ = K(|W |, ξ, φ) = lnφ−ln |W |
ln ξ
. Pick l∗ such that Pr(σ1(ω∗),σ2){E(l
∗, k∗)} > 1− ǫ for any
σ2. We show that choosing T (|Θ|, |W |, ξ, ǫ, φ) = l
∗ achieves the claim of the lemma.
Suppose that h ∈ E(l∗, k∗). If ω ∈W−ω∗(hl∗), then there exists a state ~θω ∈ Θ
i(h) such that
p(ω, ~θω) ≤ p¯(ω
∗,W ) < ξ < 1. Because state ~θω has been visited more than k
∗ times by time l∗,
19The maximum is well defined since W is a finite set and {~θ : p(ω, ~θ) 6= 1, ω ∈ W} 6= ∅ because for each
ω ∈W ⊂ Ω−ω∗ there is a state such that p(ω, ~θ) 6= 1
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and because Lωt (h) is a supermartingale, we have L
ω
t (h) ≤ p¯(ω
∗,W )k
∗
Lω0 ≤ ξ
k∗Lω0 ≤ ξ
k∗LW0
for any t ≥ l∗. Our initial choice of k∗ implies that if t > l∗ and if ω ∈ W−ω∗(hl) = W−ω∗(ht),
then Lωt (h) = µ(ω|h
t)/µ(ω∗|ht) ≤ φLW0 /|W |. Consequently, if h ∈ E(l
∗, k∗) and if t > l∗,
then µ(W−ω∗(ht)|h
t)/µ(ω∗|ht) ≤ φLW0 . Moreover, Pr(ω∗,σ2){E(l
∗, k∗)} > 1 − ǫ proving the
result. 
Corollary A.1 Assume that Γ satisfies FS. For any µ such that µ(ω∗) > 0 and χ > 0
there exists T (ω∗, µ, χ) such that
Pr(σ1(ω∗),σ2){h : µ(Σ1 \ ω
∗(ht)|ht)/µ(ω∗|ht) < χ} > 1− χ,
for any t ≥ T (ω∗, µ, χ) and any strategy σ2 of player two.
Proof: Choose finite setW ⊂ Σ1 such that µ(W ) ≥ 1−χ/2. Set ξ = p¯(ω
∗,W ), φ = χ/2LW0
and ǫ = χ. Notice that |Θ|, |W |, LW0 , and ξ depend only on µ (through the choice of the set
W ) and on ω∗. Observe that µ(Σ1 \ ω
∗(ht)|ht)/µ(ω∗|ht) ≤ µ(W \ ω∗(ht)|ht)/µ(ω∗|ht) + χ/2
for any ht and apply Lemma A.2. 
Lemma A.3 (Blackwell Optimality) Suppose Γ satisfies FS and that ω = (Θ, θ0, o, τ) is an
irreducible pure strategy finite automaton. For any σ2 ∈ Σ2, let
Uˆi(ω, σ2) = lim supN→∞
1
N
E(ω,σ2)
∑N
t=0
gi(a
t
1, a
t
2),
i.e., Uˆi(ω, σ2) is player i’s long-run average payoff. Let O2 = {σ2 : Θ→ A2} denote the finite
set of pure stationary strategies for player two. Let F (ω, δ) = co{(U1(ω, σ2, δ), U2(ω, σ2, δ)) :
σ2 ∈ Σ2} and F (ω) = co{(Uˆ1(ω, σ2), Uˆ2(ω, σ2)) : σ2 ∈ Σ2}.
(i). For any stationary strategy σ2 ∈ O2, limδ→1 Ui(ω, σ2, δ) = Ui(ω, σ2) = Uˆi(ω, σ2).
(ii). The set F (ω, δ) = co{(U1(ω, σ2, δ), U2(ω, σ2, δ)) : σ2 ∈ O2} and F (ω) = co{(U1(ω, σ2), U2(ω, σ2)) :
σ2 ∈ O2}, i.e, the finite set of vectors {(U1(ω, σ2), U2(ω, σ2)) : σ2 ∈ O2} are extreme
points of F (ω).
(iii). There exist a δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) and a pure stationary strategy o2 ∈ O2 such that o2 ∈ BR(ω, δ)
and UC1 (ω, δ) = U1(ω, o2, δ) for all δ ∈ (δ
∗, 1).
(iv). Moreover, for any stationary σ2, we have |U2(ω, σ2, δ|h
t)−U2(ω, σ2, δ|h
k)| ≤ K, |U2(ω, σ2, δ|h
t)−
U2(ω, σ2|h
k)| ≤ K, |UC1 (ω, δ|h
t)−UC1 (ω, δ|h
k)| ≤ K, and |UC1 (ω, δ|h
t)−UC1 (ω|h
k)| ≤ K,
for any ht, hk ∈ H(ω) and any stationary σ2 where K = (1− δ
|Θi|)M/(δπ)|Θ
i|.
Proof: Part (i) follows from Bertsekas (2007), chapter 4, Proposition 1.2. Part (ii) follows
from Dutta (1995), Lemma 1 because the sets F (ω, δ) and F (ω) are the set of feasible payoffs
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for a discounted and undiscounted stochastic game, respectively, where the state space is Θ,
the unique action available to player one in state θ is o(θ) and the transition function is τ .
For part (iii), first notice that against a fixed ω finding player two’s best response is a
standard discounted dynamic programming problem. Thus, a standard argument shows that
a pure stationary best response exists (see Bertsekas (2007), Chapter 1). Also notice, if σ is
a stationary strategy profile, then Ui(σ, δ|h
t) = Ui(σ, δ|h
k) for any ht, hk ∈ H(ω) such that
θ(ht) = θ(hk). Let U2(ω, δ|h
t) denote player two’s payoff after ht given that she best responds
to ω. Since a stationary best response exists U2(ω, δ|h
t) = U2(ω, δ|h
k) for any ht, hk ∈ H(ω)
such that θ(ht) = θ(hk). Player one’s commitment payoff is given by the following dynamic
program: UC1 (ω, δ|h
t) = minα2∈∆(A2)(1 − δ)g1(ω, α2) + δEy[U
C
1 (ω, δ|h
t, ω, y)|α2] subject to
(1 − δ)g2(ω, α2) + δE[U2(ω, δ|θ
′)|θ, α2] = U2(ω, δ|θ), where U2(ω, δ|θ) is player two’s payoff
in state θ given that she best responds. A standard argument shows that a pure stationary
solution to this dynamic program exists. The existence of δ∗ and o2 follows from the existence
of a Blackwell optimal policy in finite state and finite action dynamic programs. See Bertsekas
(2007), Chapter 4, Proposition 2.2.
Part (iv). Lemma A.1 implies that Pr(θ(hk+|Θ|)|θ(hk), σ2(h
k)) ≥ π|Θ| for any θ(ht), θ(hk) ∈
Θ. Let history hk be such that Ui(ω, σ2, δ|h
k) = max{hl:θ(hl)∈Θ} Ui(ω, σ2, δ|h
l) and let history
ht be such that Ui(ω, σ2, δ|h
t) = min{hl:θ(hl)∈Θ} Ui(ω, σ2, δ|h
l). We have the following two
equations
Ui(ω, σ2, δ|h
t) ≥ −(1− δ|Θ|)M + π|Θ|δ|Θ|Ui(ω, σ2, δ|h
k) + δ|Θ|(1− π|Θ|)Ui(ω, σ2, δ|h
t)
Ui(ω, σ2, δ|h
k) ≤ (1− δ|Θ|)M + π|Θ|δ|Θ|Ui(ω, σ2, δ|h
t) + δ|Θ|(1− π|Θ|)Ui(ω, σ2, δ|h
k).
Solving delivers the result. The argument for |UC1 (ω, δ|h
t)−UC1 (ω, δ|h
k)| is identical because
there is a stationary strategy for player two that delivers player one his commitment payoff.
Also, see Bertsekas (2007), Chapter 4, Proposition 1.2 for the remainder of the inequalities.

B. Proof of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1
B.1. Preliminaries. Fix a stage game Γ that satisfies FS and that has no gap. Normalize
payoffs such that (g¯1, g
b
2) = (0, 0). For this game, there exists a finite constant ρ ≥ 0 such
that the following inequalities holds:
g2 ≤ −ρg1, for any (g1, g2) ∈ F ; and g2 ≥ ρg1, for any (g1, g2) ∈ G.(1)
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In addition, if gˆ2 < 0, then the following inequality also holds:
(2) g2 ≥ ρg1, for any (g1, g2) ∈ F.
Fix a pure strategy finite automata ω∗ = (Θ∗, θ∗, o∗, τ ∗). Let ω∗θ = (Θ
∗, θ, o∗, τ ∗), that is,
ω∗θ is a pure strategy finite automaton which is identical to ω
∗ except that it may have a
different initial state θ ∈ Θ∗. Recall that the set of commitment types is a countable subset of
the set of repeated game strategies of player one Σ1. For any z ∈ (0, 1] and φ ≥ 0, let ∆ω∗,φ,z
denote the set of all measures µ over {N} ∪Σ1 with countable support such that µ(ω
∗) ≥ z
and µ(Σ1 \ {ω
∗})/µ(ω∗) ≤ φ, let ∆ω∗,z denote the set of all measures µ over {N} ∪ Σ1 with
countable support such that µ(ω∗) ≥ z, and let ∆ω∗ denote the set of all measures µ over
{N} ∪ Σ1 with countable support such that µ(ω
∗) > 0.
Definition B.1 For any z ∈ (0, 1], φ ≥ 0, and δ ∈ [0, 1) let U(δ, φ, z) = min{v(δ, φ, z), 0}
where
v(δ, φ, z) = inf{U1(ω
∗
θ , σ2, δ) : θ ∈ Θ
∗, µ ∈ ∆ω∗θ ,φ,z, σ2 is part of a NE of Γ
∞(δ, µ)}.
In words, U(δ, φ, z) is player one’s worst payoff if he plays strategy ω∗θ for some θ, if player
two plays an equilibrium strategy, if the probability of ω∗θ is at least z, and if the relative
likelihood of the other commitment types is at most φ.
Lemma B.1 Fix any δ ∈ [0, 1), z ∈ (0, 1], φ ≥ 0. Let b ≥ 0 be a constant such that
UC1 (ω
∗
θ , δ) > −b for all θ ∈ Θ
∗. Define ǫ := max{b, (1− δ|Θ
∗|)/(δπ)|Θ
∗|, φ}. Assume that there
exists constants l(ω∗) > 0 and K1(ω
∗) > 0 such that if U1(ω
∗
θ , σ2, δ) ≤ −b− x for any x > 0,
then U2(ω
∗
θ , σ2, δ) ≤ −l(ω
∗)x+K1(ω
∗)ǫ. If z ≥ z, then we have the following inequality:
U(δ, φ, z) ≥ −b − f(l(ω∗), z)ǫ, where(3)
f(l(ω∗), z) := K¯ n¯,(4)
K¯(l(ω∗)) :=
1
zlπ
max{2l(ω∗), 8ρ, 4M + l(ω∗) +K1 + ρ(5 + 8M)},(5)
n¯(z, l(ω∗)) := the smallest integer j s.t.
(
1−
πl(ω∗)z
4ρ
)j−1
< z.(6)
Proof: See Atakan and Ekmekci (2012). 
B.2. Proof of Lemma 2. We will first show, in the following lemma, that any irreducible
finite automaton satisfies the hypothesis of Lemma B.1. Then we will then use Lemma B.1
and Corollary A.1 to establish Lemma 2.
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Lemma B.2 (Unit cost lemma) If ω∗ is a irreducible finite automaton, then UC1 (ω
∗
θ , δ) ≥ −b
where b = d(ω∗) +M(1 − δ|Θ
∗|)/(δπ)|Θ
∗| for any θ ∈ Θ∗. Moreover, there exists a constant
l(ω∗) > 0 such that if U1(ω
∗
θ , σ2, δ) ≤ −b−x for some θ ∈ Θ
∗ and x > 0, then U2(ω
∗
θ , σ2, δ) ≤
−lx+K1ǫ where K1 = ρ+ lM + 1.
Proof: See proof of Lemma B.2 in Atakan and Ekmekci (2012). 
Notice that the bound in Lemma B.1 depends on both φ and δ. The learning result
in Corollary A.1 implies that the likelihood of other commitment types becomes arbitrarily
small if player one mimics type ω∗ for a sufficiently long number of periods. To prove Lemma
2 we will use the learning result in Corollary A.1 and take the limit as δ goes to 1 to show
that the bound in Lemma B.1 can be written independent of φ at the limit.
Proof of Lemma 2: See proof of Theorem 1 in Atakan and Ekmekci (2012). 
B.3. Proof of Theorem 1. For games that have a strong Stackelberg action, the proof of
Theorem 1 follows immediately from Lemma 2 as described in the main text. In this section,
we instead assume that the stage game Γ is in G but does not have a strong Stackelberg
action.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we construct the commitment type ω∗ which is an automaton
with an infinite number of states with no shortfall. Recall that for a game that does not have
a strong Stackelberg action there is no finite automaton with no shortfall. In constructing
the infinite automaton ω∗, first we describe a finite automaton that we term a “review type”
in the next section, second we establish a reputation bound for this review type (Lemma
B.5) which is a strengthened version of Lemma B.1, third we construct type ω∗ using an
infinite sequence of review types, and finally we prove the bound for ω∗ that is claimed in
Theorem 1.
B.3.1. Review types. Here we describe a pure strategy finite automaton review type with
shortfall at most ǫ which we denote as ωǫ. If a stage game has LNCI, then there exists a
positive integer P and a positive constant l > 0 such that
(7) g2(a
s
1, a2) + Pg2(a
p
1, a
′
2) < −Ml(P + 1)
for any a2 ∈ A2 such that g1(a
s
1, a2) < 0 and a
′
2 ∈ A2.
In the following we first consider a KJ-fold finitely repeated game ΓKJ(δ).20 We partition
ΓKJ into blocks of length J , ΓJ,k, k = 1, ..., K. Let uki denote player i’s time average payoff in
20This development closely follows Celentani et al. (1996), Lemma 4. Also, see the lemma’s proof in that
paper’s appendix.
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block ΓJ,k and let uKJi (δ) denote player i’s discounted payoff in the KJ-fold finitely repeated
game ΓKJ(δ). Let σKJ1 be the following strategy: in block Γ
J,1 player one plays as1 in each
period. We call a block where player one chooses to play as1 in each period a review phase.
In the beginning of block ΓJ,2, player one reviews play in the previous block. If u11 ≥ −η,
then player one again chooses to play as1 in each period of block Γ
J,2 and so on. If for any
k, uk1 < −η, then player 1 plays action a
p
1, for the next P repetitions of Γ
J,k and then plays
as1 in Γ
J,k+P+1. We call the blocks where player one chooses to play ap1 in each period a
“punishment phase”.
Lemma B.3 Given ǫ > 0 there are numbers η(ǫ), K(ǫ), J(ǫ) and discount factor δ(ǫ)
such that for any δ > δ(ǫ) and for any best response σ∗2 to σ
K(ǫ)J(ǫ)
1 in Γ
KJ(δ) player one’s
discounted payoff u
K(ǫ)J(ǫ)
1 (σ
K(ǫ)J(ǫ)
1 , σ
∗
2, δ) > −ǫ.
Proof: This construction is directly taken from Celentani et al. (1996) Lemma 4. A proof
can be found in the appendix of Celentani et al. (1996). 
Definition B.2 (Review type) Let σ∗1 denote the repeated game strategy that infinitely
repeats the strategy σ
K(ǫ)J(ǫ)
1 , that is, σ
∗
1 plays according to σ
K(ǫ)J(ǫ)
1 in periods 1 through
K(ǫ)J(ǫ), then again plays according to σ
K(ǫ)J(ǫ)
1 , in periods K(ǫ)J(ǫ)+ 1 through 2K(ǫ)J(ǫ)
and so on. The type ωǫ is the finite automaton which implements σ
∗
1 with a minimal number
of states.
The following lemma is a strengthened version of Lemma B.2 which holds for any review
type.
Lemma B.4 (Unit cost lemma for the review type) For each ǫ > 0, there exists δǫ ∈ [0, 1)
such that for all δ > δǫ
(i) UC1 (ωǫ, δ) > −ǫ,
(ii) If U1(ωǫ, σ2, δ) = −ǫ− r and r > 0, then U2(ωǫ, σ2, δ) ≤ ρǫ− lr.
Proof: Pick δǫ > δ(ǫ) where δ(ǫ) is the cutoff identified in Lemma B.3. Part (i) follows
immediately from Lemma B.3. Proof of part (ii) is as follows: The fact that inequality (7)
holds implies that there exists a δ∗ < 1 such that
(8)
Jǫ−1∑
t=0
δtg2(a
s
1, a2) +
J(ǫ)+J(ǫ)P−1∑
t=J(ǫ)
δtg2(a
p
1, a
′
2) < −lMJ(ǫ)(P + 1)
for all δ > δ∗. Also, pick δǫ to be strictly greater than δ
∗, i.e., δǫ > max{δ(ǫ), δ
∗}. For public
history ht+J(ǫ)−1 = {a01, y
0, a11, y
1, ..., a
t+J(ǫ)−1
1 , y
t+J(ǫ)−1}, let i(t+J(ǫ)−1) = 1, if
∑t+J(ǫ)−1
j=t δ
j−tg1(a
j
1, y
j) <
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−η(ǫ) and period t is the start of a review stage; and i(ht) = 0, otherwise. If i(ht+J(ǫ)−1) = 1,
then player 1 receives at least −M in period t through period t + J(ǫ) + J(ǫ)P − 1. Con-
sequently, U1(ωǫ, σ2, δ) ≥ −η(ǫ) − J(ǫ)(1 + P )(1 − δ)M(Eωǫ,σ2 [
∑∞
t=0 δ
ti(ht)]). By construc-
tion η(ǫ) < ǫ and so (1 − δ)E(ωǫ,σ2) [
∑∞
t=0 δ
ti(ht)] ≥ r/J(ǫ)(1 + P )M . If i(ht+J(ǫ)−1) = 1,
then player two receives a total discounted payoff of at most −J(ǫ)(P + 1)l(1 − δ) for
periods t through t + J(ǫ)(P + 1) − 1, if δ > δǫ by equation (8). In any block where
player one receives at least −η(ǫ), player two receives at most ρη(ǫ) < ρǫ. Consequently,
U2(ωǫ, σ2) ≤ ǫρ− J(ǫ)(1 + P )l(1− δ)E(ωǫ,σ2) [
∑∞
t=0 δ
ti(ht)] ≤ ǫρ− lr, if δ > δǫ. 
B.3.2. Reputation bound for review types. In the following we establish a reputation bound,
Lemma B.5, for the review type described above. The reputation bound is similar to Lemma
2 and the proof of the bound also uses Lemma B.1 and Lemma A.2 as the main building
blocks.
Definition B.3 For any integer n ≥ 1, define W n as the set of all finite automaton which
have fewer states than ωǫ/n and define W
n,n = {W : W ⊂ W n, |W | ≤ n} as the set of all
subsets of W n with cardinality not more than n.
The following lemma presents the reputation bound for the review type. We use this lemma
extensively in constructing ω∗.
Lemma B.5 Given n ≥ 1 and T ≥ 1, suppose that ω(n, T ) is a finite automaton whose
strategy coincides with ωǫ/n after period T . There exists a δ(n, T ) < 1 such that for any
z > 0, any µ ∈ ∆ω(n,T ),z, any δ ≥ δ(n, T ), any set W ⊂ W
n,n, and any σ ∈ NE(Γ∞(µ, δ))
the following inequality is satisfied:
U1(σ, δ) > −2ǫ/n−
ǫ/n + µ(Ω \W )
z
f(l, z),
where l is the constant given in Lemma B.4 and f is the function defined in Lemma B.1.
Proof: Clearly, there is a cutoff δ such that for all discount factors that exceed this cutoff,
the conclusions of Lemma B.4 hold for ω(n, T ).
Notice that p¯(W n, ωǫ/n) = ξ > 0, this is because ωǫ/n /∈W
n and because W n is a compact
set. Consequently, for any set W ⊂W n,n, p¯(W,ωǫ/n) ≥ ξ. Let N be such that
Pr(ω∗,σ2)
{
h :
µ(W |ht)
µ(ω(n, T )|ht)
µ(ω(n, T ))
µ(W )
< ǫ/n
}
> 1− ǫ/n,
for any t ≥ N . Such a N exists by Lemma A.2 and only depends on ǫ, T , and n. The result
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then follows from Lemma B.1 and is analogous to the proof of Lemma 2. 
In what follows, we drop the reference to l in f(l, z) because the uniform cost l we use (as
defined in Lemma B.4) for establishing the above bound for ω(n, T ) is always the same for
any n and any T .
B.3.3. Constructing type ω∗. The type ω∗ starts by playing a strategy that coincides with
the strategy of the review type with shortfall at most ǫ, i.e., ωǫ, for T1 periods, then plays
a strategy that coincides with the strategy of the review type with shortfall at most ǫ/2 for
T2 periods, and plays a strategy that coincides with the strategy of the review type with
shortfall at most ǫ/n for Tn periods, and so on. Therefore, this type is identified by a sequence
of period lengths, T1, T2, .., Tn, ... which we will pick recursively. We will also simultaneously
pick a sequence of intervals of discount factors, [δ1, δ¯1], [δ2, δ¯2], ..., such that limi→∞ δi = 1.
Definition B.4 ΓN(δ, µ) is a N period repeated game, where the stage game is Γ. The
types in ΓN(δ, µ) belong to the set ΩN that is obtained as follows: For every ω ∈ Ω, there
exists a corresponding ωN whose strategy coincides with the strategy of ω during the finitely
repeated game, i.e., ωN is the projection of the infinitely repeated game strategy ω on the first
N periods. Moreover, the probability of ωN in the beginning of the finitely repeated game is
µ(ω).
Definition B.5 For any ξ > 0, let NEξ(Γ
N(µ, δ)) denote the set of ξ Bayes-Nash equilibria
of the finitely repeated game ΓN(µ, δ) (see Radner (1981)).
For the following, recall that δǫ/n is the cutoff level of the discount factor that achieves the
desiderata of Lemma B.4. (i.e., the δǫ/n in Lemma B.4 that exists for the review type with
shortfall at most ǫ/n). Notice that δ(n, T ) ≥ δǫ/n.
Lemma B.6 Suppose that [δ, δ¯] ⊂ [δ(n, T ), 1). Then there exists a ξ([δ, δ¯]) > 0 and an
integer T ∗([δ, δ¯]) such that: for any z > 0, any µ ∈ ∆ω(n,T ),z, any set W ∈ W
n,n, any
δ ∈ [δ, δ¯], any ξ ≤ ξ([δ, δ¯]), any N ≥ T ∗([δ, δ¯]), and any σ ∈ NEξ(Γ
N(µ, δ)) the following
inequality is satisfied:
U1(σ, δ) ≥ −3ǫ/n−
ǫ/n+ µ(Ω \W )
z
f(z).
Proof: On the way to a contradiction, suppose that the lemma is not true. Then we can
pick a convergent sequence of ξk, discount factors, sets of finite automata, priors, and strategy
profiles {ξk, δk, µk,Wk, zk, σk}
∞
k=1 with ξk > 0 and limk→∞ ξk = 0, δk ∈ [δ, δ¯], µk ∈ ∆ω(n,T ),zk ,
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Wk ∈ W
n,n and σk ∈ NEξk(Γ
k(µk, δk)) such that
U1(σk, δk) < −3ǫ/n− f(zk)
ǫ/n + µk(Ω \Wk)
zk
.
Let the limit of the sequence be {0, δ, µ,W, z, σ} satisfying δ ∈ [δ, δ¯] and µ ∈ ∆ω(n,T ),z.
21 We
have σ ∈ NE(Γ∞(µ, δ)) since limk→∞ ξk = 0 and all other terms converge to a limit.
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We will now consider two cases: First, if z = 0, then the right hand side of the displayed
inequality in the lemma will be arbitrarily small because f(0) = ∞. However U1(σk, δk) is
bounded below a finite number since player 1’s minimax is a finite number. So it cannot
be that z = 0. Second, if z > 0, then U1(σ, δ) ≤ −3ǫ/n − f(z)
ǫ/n+µ(Ω\W )
z
which contradicts
Lemma B.5. 
Choosing T1 and the interval [δ1, δ¯1].We pick δ1 > δ(1, 0) and δ¯1 > δǫ/2. Hence, the interval
[δ1, δ¯1] satisfies the hypothesis of Lemma B.6. By Lemma B.6 there exists a ξ > 0 and integer
T ∗ such that for any z > 0, any µ ∈ ∆ω(1,0),z , any set W ∈W
1,1, any δ ∈ [δ1, δ¯1], any T ≥ T
∗,
and any σ ∈ NEξ(Γ
T (µ, δ)) the following inequality is satisfied:
U1(σ, δ) ≥ −3ǫ−
ǫ+ µ(Ω \W )
z
K n¯.
We pick T1 so that T1 ≥ T
∗ and δ¯T11 M ≤ min{ǫ, ξ}. Consequently, we have the following:
Remark 2 Let ω be an infinitely repeated game strategy that coincides with ω(1, 0) during
the first T1 periods. We claim that for any δ ∈ [δ1, δ¯1], any W ∈ W
1,1, any z > 0, any
µ ∈ ∆ω,z and any σ that is a NE profile of Γ
∞(µ, δ)
U1(σ, δ) ≥ −4ǫ−
ǫ+ µ(Ω \W )
z
K n¯.
Proof: Let σT1 be the projection of σ on the first T1 periods. Since δ¯
T1
1 M ≤ ξ, σT1 is a ξ
Bayes Nash equilibrium of ΓT1(µ, δ). Therefore U1(σT1 , δ) > −3ǫ −
ǫ+µ(Ω\W )
z
f(z) by Lemma
B.6. We now use the inequality δ¯T11 ≤ ǫ to argue that |U1(σ, δ)− U1(σT1 , δ)| ≤ δ¯
T1
1 M ≤ ǫ and
we conclude that U1(σ, δ) ≥ −4ǫ−
ǫ+µ(Ω\W )
z
f(z). 
Now we choose Tn and the interval [δn, δ¯n] given {T1, ..., Tn−1} and {[δ1, δ¯1], ..., [δn−1, δ¯n−1]}.
Let Tˆn =
∑n−1
i=1 Ti. For n = 1, define the strategy Dǫ/n := ωǫ and for n > 1, define Dǫ/n
21We use the Euclidean distance for ξk, δk, and inherent product topology for convergence of µk and
the strategies σk.
22This is standard see for instance Myerson (1991) page 144, Theorem 3.4 or Fudenberg and Levine (1986)
Proposition 4.1.
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recursively as follows: Dǫ/n coincides with Dǫ/(n−1) up to a time Tˆn and then coincides with
ωǫ/n.
Lemma B.7 Suppose that [δ, δ¯] ⊂ [max{δǫ/n, δ(n−1, Tˆn−1)}, 1). Then there exists a ξ([δ, δ¯]) >
0 and an integer T ∗([δ, δ¯]) such that: for any z > 0, any µ ∈ ∆Dǫ/n,z, any set W ∈W
n−1,n−1,
any δ ∈ [δ, δ¯], any ξ ≤ ξ([δ, δ¯]), any T ≥ T ∗([δ, δ¯]), and any σ ∈ NEξ(Γ
T (µ, δ)) the following
inequality is satisfied:
U1(σ, δ) ≥ −3ǫ/(n− 1)−
ǫ/(n− 1) + µ(Ω \W )
z
f(z).
Proof: This argument is similar to the argument for Lemma B.6. We again obtain a
contradiction to Lemma B.5. We arrive at the contradiction by using the facts that for
all δ ≥ max{δǫ/n, δ(n − 1, Tˆn−1)} we have first U
C
1 (Dǫ/n, δ) > −ǫ/(n − 1), and second if
U1(Dǫ/n, σ2, δ) = −ǫ/(n − 1)− r and r > 0, then U2(Dǫ/n, σ2, δ) ≤ ρǫ/(n− 1)− lr. In other
words the conclusions of Lemma B.4 hold and thus Lemma B.5 applies for Dǫ/n. 
We pick interval of discount factors [δn, δ¯n] as follows: Let δn be such that δn > δ¯n−1
and δn > δ(n, Tˆn), and for the upper end, δ¯n > δn, δ¯n > δǫ/(n+1). Notice that the interval
[δn, δ¯n] satisfies the hypothesis of Lemma B.6 by construction because δn > δ(n, Tˆn). Also,
the interval [δ¯n−1, δ¯n] satisfies the hypothesis of Lemma B.7 by construction because δ¯n−1 ≥
max{δǫ/n, δ(n− 1, Tˆn−1)}.
We now pick T n. Let ξ∗ > 0 be the cutoff ξ([δ¯n−1, δ¯n]) obtained in Lemma B.7, ξ
∗∗ > 0
be the cutoff ξ([δn, δ¯n]) obtained in Lemma B.6, and let ξn := min{ξ
∗, ξ∗∗, ǫ/n)} > 0. First,
Lemma B.6 implies that there exists T ∗∗ such that for all δ ∈ [δn, δ¯n], all N ≥ T
∗∗ + Tˆn, all
W ∈W n,n, all µ ∈ ∆Dǫ/n,z and all σN ∈ NEξn(Γ
N (µ, δ))
(9) U1(σN , δ) > −3ǫ/n− f(z)
ǫ/n + µ(Ω \W )
z
.
Second, Lemma B.7 implies that there exists T ∗∗∗ such that for all δ ∈ [δn−1, δ¯n], all N ≥
T ∗∗∗ + Tˆn, all W ∈ W
n−1,n−1, all µ ∈ ∆Dǫ/n,z and all σN ∈ NEξn(Γ
N(µ, δ))
(10) U1(σN , δ) > −3ǫ/(n− 1)− f(z)
ǫ/(n− 1) + µ(Ω \W )
z
.
We pick Tn such that Tn ≥ max{T
∗∗, T ∗∗∗} and δ¯Tˆn+Tnn M < min{ξn, ǫ/n}.
Lemma B.8 Suppose that ω that coincides with Dǫ/n during the periods zero through Tˆn+Tn.
For all W ∈W n−1,n−1, all z > 0, all µ ∈ ∆ω,z, all δ ∈ [δn−1, δ¯n], and all σ ∈ NE(Γ
∞(µ, δ)),
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we have
(11) U1(σ, δ) > −4ǫ/(n− 1)− f(z)
ǫ/(n− 1) + µ(Ω \W )
z
.
Proof: Let σ be a NE of Γ∞(µ, δ) for some δ ∈ [δn−1, δ¯n]. Our choice of Tn was such
that δ¯Tˆn+Tnn M < min{ξn, ǫ/n}. Therefore, if δ ≤ δ¯n, then the projection of σ on the first
N = Tˆn + Tn periods, σN is a ξn Bayes-Nash equilibrium of Γ
N(µ, δ). Therefore, inequalities
(9) and (10) together imply that U1(σN , δ) > −3ǫ/(n − 1) − f(z)
ǫ/(n−1)+µ(Ω\W )
z
. However,
because δ¯Nn M < ǫ/n, the payoffs after period N affect player 1’s payoffs by at most ǫ/n as
long as δ ≤ δ¯n. Hence, U1(σ, δ) ≥ U1(σN , δ)− ǫ/(n− 1). 
B.3.4. Completing the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof: We show that if µ ∈ ∆ω∗,z, z > 0, and all the commitment types other than ω
∗
in the support of µ are finite automata, then, UNE1 (µ) = 0. Fix any χ > 0. There exists
an n > 1 and a W ∈ W n−1,n−1 such that for every n′ ≥ n, 4ǫ
n′−1
+ f(z) ǫ/(n
′−1)+µ(Ω\W )
z
< χ.
This follows from the fact that Ω is a countable set of finite automata. Also, by Lemma B.8,
U1(σ, δ) ≥ −
4ǫ
n−1
−f(z) ǫ/(n−1)+µ(Ω\W )
z
, for any δ ≥ δn, and any σ ∈ NE(Γ
∞(µ, δ)). Therefore,
we have the following inequalities:
limδˆ→1 infδ≥δˆ,σ∈NE(Γ∞(µ,δ)) U1(σ, δ) ≥ infδ≥δn,σ∈NE(Γ∞(µ,δ)) U1(σ, δ)
≥ −
4ǫ
n− 1
− f(z)
ǫ/(n− 1) + µ(Ω \W )
z
≥ −χ.
Since χ is arbitrary, lim infδ→1,σ∈NE(Γ∞(µ,δ)) U1(σ, δ) = U
NE
1 (µ) = 0. 
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